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**US AFRICA COMMAND: Paradigm Change for the  
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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** US AFRICA COMMAND: Paradigm Change for the Combatant Command

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**Thesis:** All geographic combatant commands must be reorganized, similar to USAFRICOM, to incorporate interagency players into planning and operations, in order to more effectively apply the elements of national power to successfully achieve U.S. national security objectives.

**Discussion:** Due to the increasing complexities of modern warfare, the United States must adapt to successfully counter emerging threats to national security. The unified command plan was designed to defeat and contain cold-war enemies, and relied extensively on military power to protect national security interests. However, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the increasing complexity of the new global systems of power, the United States must adjust its foreign strategy to face challenging new threats. The structure of the geographic combatant command has not changed since its inception in the 1940s, and is still operating under an antiquated model designed for traditional warfare. The development of USAFRICOM is the future of U.S. foreign policy because of its enhanced organization and new active security strategy. The changes incorporated by USAFRICOM enable the geographic combatant commander to incorporate all elements of national power by using the Smart Power model. Due to the integration of interagency personnel and the new organizational structure, USAFRICOM is designed to address theater-specific problems. Additionally, USAFRICOM's strategy is based on the active security concept which seeks to build partner nations' abilities to address local security and development problems without assistance from the United States.

**Conclusion:** USAFRICOM is structured and organized to include the interagency into all aspects of planning and operations, incorporating all elements of national power to successfully achieve U.S. national objectives. Although this new organization and strategy might seem to reduce the focus on kinetic military operations, USAFRICOM is fully organized and equipped to conduct full scale military operations. This paradigm shift provides the geographic combatant commander with a full compliment of war fighting capabilities and expertise never before achieved, and serves as the future model for the remaining combatant commands.

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## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

All geographic combatant commands must be reorganized, similar to USAFRICOM, to incorporate interagency players into planning and operations, in order to more effectively apply the elements of national power to successfully achieve U.S. national security objectives.

A new strategy must be developed in order to achieve U.S. national security objectives utilizing more holistic means. The smart power model is a new approach to applying national power by incorporating varying degrees of coercion supported by the military, information operations, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, ideology, politics, society and culture. The events of the last decade have shown that the complexity of modern conflict requires that the United States must employ all the elements of national power available, both kinetic and non-kinetic means, to be successful. Future enemies will not be successfully defeated with conventional military power alone, but must be defeated using the full spectrum national power.

As of October 2008, the DOD has incorporated the interagency into the geographic combatant command construct under USAFRICOM. Although USAFRICOM is the first geographic combatant command to fully incorporate interagency personnel into its staff, this model provides the most promising means to achieving national security objectives. Because the DOD is the largest and best funded department within the US government, these geographic combatant commands are often the primary instrument to mitigate foreign threats to national interests. Because of the unity of command provided under USAFRICOM, this will offer a fundamental change in the means in which the U.S. projects national power. Geographic combatant commands that are still operating under the old organization are ill equipped to

successfully combat modern enemies due to their lack of integration with the interagency. As a result, those combatant commanders have developed Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) in an attempt to provide their command's access to interagency capabilities. Although these JIACG have helped to improve interagency cooperation in the interim, the JIACG falls short of providing a full spectrum of national capabilities to combatant commanders.

Without the benefit of a Goldwater-Nichols equivalent legislation to force interagency cooperation amongst all branches of government, changes have begun to take place within the DOD to incorporate a more holistic approach to developing national strategy. The development of USAFRICOM embodies the latest in a series of sweeping changes taking place that will make it possible to incorporate all the elements of national power through the smart power model, in order to successfully achieve national security objectives. There are two major departures that make USAFRICOM more capable of achieving U.S. security objectives, a change in basic strategy, and a modified structure that incorporates personnel from interagency organizations. These changes provide USAFRICOM with a full compliment of capabilities and expertise never before available to a geographic combatant commander, and will serve as the future model to successfully achieve national security objectives.

### **Research Methodology**

Given the complexities of current international affairs, US national security strategy demands a means to achieve a wide range of national objectives in order to capitalize on the synergistic effect of all the elements of national power. Working within the construct of the existing unified command plan, USAFRICOM was developed to make the best use of the nation's resources to achieve its mission. USAFRICOMs structure and mission make it uniquely adapted to address the complexities and nuances of modern conflict. The goal of this paper is to

show why USAFRICOM is better suited to accomplish the national security goals of the United States. Second, this paper addresses why geographic combatant commands would benefit from an organization and mission change similar to USAFRICOM.

## **CHAPTER 2 – THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN**

### **History**

The formalization of the Unified Command Plan in 1946, and the National Security Act of 1947, established a radical change in the command and control structure for the DOD.<sup>1</sup> By establishing geographic combatant commanders, the President and Secretary of Defense could delegate authority to military commanders without being overwhelmed by operational level commitments. Moreover, each geographic combatant commander and his staff would be intimately familiar with a specific region of the world. These newly formed military commands would provide regional expertise on their region's military forces and capabilities, history, culture, and maintain vigilance on emerging threats to US national security.

There were two reasons for the development of the unified command plan after World War II. Politicians and the DOD leadership came to the realization that they needed to delegate authority and take advantage of the synergy gained by conducting joint operations. As the former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during WWII and Supreme Commander of NATO, President Dwight Eisenhower, had a clear understanding of the effectiveness of joint operations when he said, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services as one concentrated effort... singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service."<sup>2</sup>



The unified command plan, emerging joint policies, and legislation finally provided the U.S. with a dedicated corps of national security and regional experts. These changes greatly contributed to U.S. military and political successes throughout the Cold War era. Although President Eisenhower and other government leaders understood the need to achieve interoperability between the services, it would still take nearly 30 years for legislation to be passed before joint cooperation would be formalized through the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

However, the regionalization of American foreign interests since World War II, national foreign policy has continued to manifest itself as either a (diplomatic or military) approach. Diplomacy did, and still does serve as the primary means for solving national strategic problems. However, if diplomacy fails, the military is tasked to take more coercive measures to achieve national security objectives. The current structure of geographic combatant command was designed to deal with cold war enemies. However, as the nature of conflict continued to change after the cold-war, U.S. leaders failed to fully understand the evolving nature of warfare. This failure left the U.S. government unable to respond to more complicated transnational threats.

As stated in the 2006 National Security Strategy, "The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed."<sup>3</sup> This quote illustrates that it was 2006 before the Bush administration formally realized the flawed nature of the U.S. national security apparatus, giving impetus for the development of USAFRICOM. However, in order for the United States to have success in future campaigns it must also embrace a more comprehensive design for the application of national power.

## CHAPTER 3 – RETHINKING NATIONAL POWER

### DIME

With the exception of USAFRICOM, geographic combatant commands are structured to exert national power according to the DIME model. Traditionally, national power is defined in terms of how a nation may exert control through Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic otherwise known as the DIME model. Although there are similar variations on this national power model, such as PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information systems) and MIDLIFE (military, information, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economics), the concept is the same, in that the state has several means to exert power over separate lines of operation.

In theory, there should be one entity or government organization that has the lead on a particular component of national power. Using the DIME model per figure 1, the DOD's jurisdiction on military power is the purest form of absolute control by a single organization. The Department of State may claim to have the lead in diplomacy, which is certainly true regarding official diplomacy. However, the reality and complexity of the current global environment means that any person or any organization involved in overseas communication or commerce is exercising a form of diplomacy, which the DOS has little control. Likewise, with the exception of the U.S. government establishing trade policy, the globalization of the world economy has made it impractical for governments to control all aspects of its economy. Furthermore, the intelligence agencies may claim authority over information operations, but there is no central control or authority over strategic communications or information operations.

The ability to attempt the successfully manage all these elements has been referred to as the DIME Ballet, characterizing the intricate choreography required to manage the components of national power.<sup>4</sup> Although national power is easily understood under the DIME model, it lends itself to niche capabilities in application, and is not well suited for the complexities of modern warfare. Despite the continued popularity of DIME, this model is no longer relevant because of it lacks the flexibility and speed required to mobilize national power against contemporary enemies. Because of this, geographic combatant commands are less effective at achieving their missions along these lines of operation.




Figure 1 demonstrates the nature of the separation of the power in the DIME construct.

### **Soft Power and Hard Power**

The soft and hard power model is not a new concept. President Theodore Roosevelt's quote "talk softly and carry a big stick," illustrates the utility of both coercion and force to achieve an objective. Joseph Nye coined the phrase "soft power" as a method to obtain desired outcomes without the use of force, or "hard power."<sup>5</sup> In the context of this paper, power is defined as the ability to influence another to act in a manner which the entity would have otherwise acted.<sup>6</sup> According to Nye, there are three methods to affect the behavior of others: through threat of, or use of force, use of bribes, and attraction through cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

Historically, national power has been associated with traditional metrics of dominance and the ability to wage war. Resources such as population, natural resources, economic, and military strength were key to a nation's power in relation to its adversaries.<sup>8</sup> A government meeting these criteria would have the means to overpower an opponent or compel its neighbors into compliance with its objectives. Implements of hard power might be derived directly from the DIME model, with the use of coercive diplomacy, information dominance, military kinetic action or threat of force, and use of economic sanctions to control an opponent's financial system. However due to globalization, the reality of modern conflict makes it exceedingly difficult to achieve tangible results from hard power alone. The short comings of hard power demand a new way to exercise state power by another means.<sup>9</sup>

More recently, the geographic combatant commands have attempted to exert power via the soft and hard power model. However, despite the best efforts and intentions of the geographic commander's to operate according to the soft and hard power model, their organizations are simply ill equipped and lack the capacity to achieve success without the integration of the interagency. Figure two is a representation of the linear nature of the soft power and hard power model. Although a distinct departure from the DIME, this model shows the separate relationship between military action (hard power) and attractive or diplomatic attractiveness (soft power).




Figure 2. J. Nye, *Bound to Lead*, p. 267.

## Smart Power

Unlike the DIME model, which stove-pipes authority divided along disparate lines of operation, or the soft power/hard power model which provides a lineal progression of either coercion or force, the smart power model integrates a grand strategy to combine hard and soft power.<sup>10</sup> The smart power model is built upon three tenets: First, America's standing in the world matters to our security and prosperity; Second, today's challenges can only be addressed with capable and willing allies and partners; And third, civilian tools can increase the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of U.S. Government policies.<sup>11</sup> USAFRICOM was designed to work utilizing the tenets of the smart power model.

The first principle of smart power states that America's standing in the world matters. The concept of smart power is a radical departure from the Bush doctrine outlined in the National Security Strategy in 2002, whereas the U.S. retains the freedom to act unilaterally to defend its borders, to include preemptive war.<sup>12</sup> This policy has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. However, the Bush administration's rhetoric softened after greater attention and understanding was developed in the face of emerging challenges. This first principle of smart power also states that America must regain its ideological status in the world, reverting back to President Ronald Reagan's vision, "America is a shining city upon a hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere." U.S. foreign policy and information operations should pursue idealistic aspirations and goals that inspire cooperation throughout the global community.

The second principle suggests that coercive means is not sufficient to achieve sustainable ends. Although coercion may be a more amiable way of exerting power, this does not guarantee

that the subject nation will have a genuine interest in maintaining U.S. objectives. The smart power model insists that the U.S. must build the capacity and desire for shared interests through partnering. In other words, if the subject country does not have a genuine interest in the outcome, or the capability to sustain a program, then it will ultimately fail. Without aide or assistance from the patron nation, the program or objective will die. Without capable and willing partners devoted to shared security interests, the U.S. will be forced to either continue costly measures (manpower and treasure), or succumb to a an undesirable ends.

Finally, the notion that civilian tools can increase policy legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability, sounds like a call to correct the dysfunctional interagency process of the U.S. Government. This call to fix the interagency will be the most extensive, and has the most potential to empower those tasked with implementing national foreign policy. Ironically, fixing interagency cooperation may elicit the most reluctance from bureaucrats with vested interests in maintaining their organization's status quo and power. Most discouraging is the fact that there is little consensus on the nature of the new interagency. Basic questions such as, what should the interagency look like, will there be unity of command over such an organization, who will be in charge, which organization or individual should be in command, are all crucial questions that must be answered.

Without new legislation or a presidential directive to lead the way, any interagency cooperation is likely to flounder. However, since 2003, leaders, politicians and academics have struggled to find a more comprehensive strategy to defend the interests of the United States. The fusion of the smart power model with the development of USAFRICOM seems to be a viable command with the ability to operate successfully in any spectrum of warfare. Nonetheless,

without effective leadership, decision making and proper national strategy, this structure alone will not be successful.

As figure 3 illustrates, the smart power equalizer discards the lineal relationship between hard and soft power. The equalizer portrays a model in which the level of coercion may be controlled along functional lines of operation (military, information, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, ideological, political, societal, and cultural). As feed back is provided on the success or failure of an operation, the degree of coercion may be modified while fine tuning the level of participation along functional areas.




Figure 3 provided by Matt Armstrong,

(<http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=2283>).

## CHAPTER 4 – EVOLVING NATIONAL STRATEGY

### National Security Strategy

The national security interests of the United States includes preserving U.S. political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies.<sup>13</sup> Since geographic combatant commands are often the primary means to secure U.S. interests abroad, combatant commanders are empowered to organize their staffs to best achieve their individual missions. USAFRICOM has been organized to secure the security interest of the United States utilizing a more comprehensive and holistic approach.

A review of the 2006 National Security Strategy outlines nine essential tasks:<sup>14</sup>

1. Champion aspirations for human dignity.
2. Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.
3. Work with others to defuse regional conflicts.
4. Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
5. Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.
6. Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.



7. Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power.
8. Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
9. Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.

Of these nine essential tasks, only three may require military power to achieve a national objective: (1) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks; (2) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; (3) Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The remaining six tasks focus on objectives that can only be made through diplomacy, information superiority, and economic development. Accordingly, Secretary Gates has begun to shift the focus of the DOD to accomplish these national security objectives through non-kinetic means throughout the world.<sup>15</sup>

#### **National Defense Strategy**

Consequently, the National Defense Strategy for 2008 outlines five objectives to achieve national security tasks.<sup>16</sup> As detailed below, the focus of effort for the DOD has shifted towards utilizing smart power, instead of kinetic actions.

1. Defend the Homeland.
2. Win the Long War.
3. Promote Security.
4. Deter Conflict.
5. Win our Nation's Wars

It is arguable that in this list, "win our nation's wars" is the only objective directly tied to kinetic military action. The other four objectives are either a function of law enforcement, or are

dependant on partnership building, cooperation and the use of non-kinetic power. This change in strategy illustrates the need for a shift in the DOD's defense strategy from hard to smart power. Despite its vast resources and personnel, the DOD has been ill equipped for assuming smart power roles and has failed, in many regards, to properly train its military personnel and officers to conduct "smart power" operations. The DOD has realized the need to change its focus towards a smart power model, while maintaining its core warfighting competency. This change in strategy was recently outlined most recently in the 2008 defense strategy. The most cost effective way to accomplish this goal without completely restructuring the DOD and without radically modifying military training was to capitalize on existing government organizations that were better suited to utilize smart power.

## **CHAPTER 5 – U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

### **Concept**

As stated by President George W. Bush in 2006, the US national security strategy is built upon two pillars: promoting freedom, and growing a community of democracies.<sup>17</sup> These objectives cannot be achieved through military actions alone, but will ultimately be accomplished with effective diplomacy, strategic communications, and sound global economic policies. The way to achieve these ends is primarily through soft power (attractive to partner nations), versus hard power (coercive in nature). The recent inauguration of the USAFRICOM in October 2008, was the first step towards consolidating all the elements of national power under a single combatant commander. USAFRICOM was designed around two uniquely different principles: active security and the integration of US efforts within a single command.

Organizationally, USAFRICOM was designed to incorporate interagency personnel within the command structure, not just relegated to a coordination group. USAFRICOM is unique because civilian personnel from the interagency are working side by side with DOD personnel.<sup>18</sup> This new construct allows a distinct approach to conducting operations and developing strategy and policy without relying completely on defense department personnel. The integration of interagency personnel is the key strength of USAFRICOM and is the most important departure from traditional geographic combatant commands.

### **Organization**

Typical combatant commands are built on the J-code construct which is focus around the warfighting functions (J1-Admin, J2 Intelligence, J3 Operations, J4 Logistics, J5 Planning, and J6 Communications). Additional staff sections may be added according to the combatant commander's preference. This command structure has been adopted by most modern military staffs and has been in place, in one form or another, since the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. During the initial planning stages for USAFRICOM, the operational planning team decided to organize the staff along different functional lines of operation, along interagency lines.

The newest and possibly most innovative directorate is the Office for Outreach that focuses on the evolving and increasingly important role of strategic communications. The Strategic Communications cell ensures the messages and themes are consistent throughout the command. This directorate includes the Partnership Division, which maintains affiliation with intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and multinational agencies and missions that operate in the region. The Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Programs conducts contingency planning as well as security assistance and military to military operations. The Directorate of Intelligence




Figure 4 shows the current staff organization of USAFRICOM.

performs duties beyond that of a traditional J2. This directorate will seek to gain a greater understanding of the strategic environment from a regional perspective as well as allow more sharing of intelligence with partners. The Directorate of C4 performs typical communications and informational infrastructure, but focuses on information sharing capabilities horizontally, among the staff sections within the command. The Directorate for Operations and Logistics consolidates all current and future military operations typical of most J-3 shops. Divisions within this directorate include current and future operations, antiterrorism, logistics support, information operations, medical and engineering, as well as deployment and distribution operations center. In addition to performing human resource and comptroller functions, The

Directorate of Resources houses the Strategic Capabilities Division, monitoring advances in science and technology.<sup>19</sup>

Realizing that appropriate leadership would be an essential part of the organization, the Deputy Commander to Civil-Military Affairs was given to a senior Department of State (DOS) official who serves equally with the Deputy to Military Operations. Under the Directorate of Plans and Programs, there is a senior US Agency for International Development (USAID) official serving as the director of programs. There are also senior advisors from the Department of Treasury and Department of Homeland Security serving under the Directorate of Plans and Programs. Furthermore, an official from the Department of Commerce fills the Deputy Director of Resources position. These key personnel share equal power to their military counterparts with the exception of being able to lead troops in the field, and are dispersed throughout the headquarters. These staff members provide the unified commander with invaluable interagency expertise and provide direct input into the decision and policy-making process. In other geographic combatant commands, personnel from the interagency are relegating to the joint interagency working group. However, a new structure without a change in strategy does would fail to achieve desire results according to the smart power model.

## **CHAPTER 6 – NEW STRATEGY**

### **Active Security**

Until now, U.S. foreign policy and joint doctrine ascribed to the Phase Zero policy, which is defined as a shaping action. Consequently, many potential partner nations have defined the phrase "phase zero" as a precursor to kinetic military action.<sup>20</sup> Although this distinction may

seem a trivial matter of semantics, perception in foreign relations is extremely important. The principle of active security differs from phase zero in that it seeks to utilize smart power to engage in sustained activities and programs to achieve shared goals with partner nations. Most importantly, active security is a fundamental departure in how the U.S. conducts security assistance with partner nations. The US cannot achieve national security objectives without the interest and cooperation from partner nations. Although partner nations may oblige US efforts out of self-interest, their efforts will certainly be guided by the attractiveness of the US policies.<sup>21</sup> As a result of the horizontal command structure and integrated staff empowered by a fundamental change in philosophy, USAFRICOM should be well suited to achieve US national security objectives in Africa.

USAFRICOM's new active security strategy seeks to provide governments with sustainable means to provide security in their respective countries. This will prevent future conflict, and/or the need for unilateral intervention from the US.<sup>22</sup> USAFRICOM will provide a single point of contact for African partner nations for all US constituents under one command. The end result is the reduction in redundancy of effort and conflict of interest within the region. Furthermore, active security programs seek to enable partners to increase their governments' legitimacy. This is done by minimizing foreign threats to their sovereignty while bolstering internal stability by increasing their capacity to provide services, improve responsiveness to humanitarian disasters, defend territorial borders and promote peace-keeping capabilities.

#### **Better Organization for COCOMs**

After a review of the geographic combatant command's mission statements, there is a common goal; to promote regional stability and cooperation with partner nations to achieve

national security objectives. These geographic combatant commands cannot achieve this singular objective through military to military exercises, the threat or use of force, or even when enabled with a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). This common objective can only be accomplished by a geographic combatant command with an integrated staff with permanent personnel from throughout the interagency. Accordingly these interagency personnel must be empowered as co-equals to defense personnel and actively participating in planning and operations. The flexibility of a military and interagency staff provides the combatant commander with the flexibility needed to conduct full spectrum operations from all out kinetic warfare, to active security operations using the smart power model. The functional and organizational design of USAFRICACOM was designed explicitly to operate in the complex and fluid environment.

USAFRICOM may appear to a kinder and gentler geographic command compared to sister commands like USCENTCOM, however, it is fully organized and equipped to conduct full spectrum kinetic operations. Just as General Eisenhower recognized the synergy obtained by joint operations, so did the Bush administration identify the need to integrate the interagency into the geographic combatant command.

## **CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION**

The state of modern warfare suggests that the character of war may have changed forever. The emergence of non-state actors, global organizations, and super-empowered individuals, empowered by globalization and technology has greatly complicated the world in which the United States must operate. Geographic combatant commands were designed to

protect the interests of the United States against traditional nation-states and cold-war enemies. However, these commands are ill equipped to effectively employ all the elements of national power using the smart power model. Although every geographic combatant command has an interagency component, the few individuals that comprise the JIACG offer only part-time liaison personnel. These few liaison personnel are neither integrated into the staff, nor are they given equal authority regarding operations or contingency planning. The shortfall among the geographic combatant commands has reduced their effectiveness and ability to operate in today's global environment.

Despite the optimistic position of this paper, USAFRICOM may still face significant challenges ahead. Foremost is the fact that USAFRICOM is a fledgling command which hasn't reached its first year in operation. Even though the COCOM boundaries have been drawn there must be a close cooperation between AFRICOM and CENTCOM regarding turnover of responsibility from CENTCOM and EUCOMs previous areas of responsibility, as well as coordination in executing the Global War on Terror. Furthermore, it may take a while to reestablish relationships between African partner nations while continuing to transition from the previous COCOMs (EUCOM and CENTCOM) and AFRICOM. There is also significant skepticism amongst many African partners as to the true motives of American interest on the continent. One manifestation of this is the fact that no African country has offered to allow USAFRICOM to establish its headquarters in their country. Although this was initially a failure in US strategic communications during the early stages of AFRICOMs development this certainly doesn't look good for an organization that is built around partnering and cultural understanding. Despite these challenges and initial short-comings there are still bright prospects that USAFRICOM may present a fundamental positive change for American foreign policy.



USAFRICOM represents the future structure and mission of the nation's geographic combatant commands. There is no other institution within the U.S. government that has the ability to project the nation's power like the geographic combatant command. However, the United States must pursue more holistic means to achieve its national security objectives. USAFRICOM's unique structure and organization, appears to provide this holistic approach due to its organization and mission. Although USAFRICOM is a fledgling command, this is the first time the US government has successfully collectivized agencies representing all the forms of national power. While bureaucrats and academics continue to debate over how to best achieve interagency cooperation, the DOD has acted. Despite the claims of cynics, USAFRICOM represents the future of interagency cooperation and the most immediate and effective way for the nation to achieve its national security objectives. In the absence of any other organization that can incorporate all the elements of our nation's power, it is time to incorporate similar organizational and structural changes to the remaining geographic combatant commands.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Kelly Houlgate, "The Naval Institute: Proceedings." *Proceedings* vol 132, no. 9 (Sept 2005), [http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/issues.asp?issue\\_year=2005](http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/archive/issues.asp?issue_year=2005) (accessed on Feb 03, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Dwight Eisenhower, Presidential Message, 3 Apr 1958, Public Papers of Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 (1959), 274-290.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. National Security Counsel, *National Security Strategy 2006*, pp 43.

<sup>4</sup> Austin Bay, "The DIME Ballet" *strategypage.com* May 24, 2005. [http://www.strategypage.com/on\\_point/2005524.aspx](http://www.strategypage.com/on_point/2005524.aspx). (Accessed on February 19, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 154-165.

<sup>6</sup> Ernest J. Wilson III, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power," *The Annals of the American Academy* 616 (March 2008): 114.

<sup>7</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Benefits of Soft Power* (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2 June 2004), 1.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990):154.

<sup>9</sup> Ernest J. Wilson III, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power," *The Annals of the American Academy* 616 (March 2008): 112.

<sup>10</sup> Richard L. Armitage, and Joseph S. Nye Jr. "Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform." Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., April 24, 2008. pp 3.

<sup>11</sup> Richard L. Armitage, and Joseph S. Nye Jr. "Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform." Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations committee. 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., April 24, 2008. pp 3.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. National Security Counsel, *National Security Strategy 2002*, Foreward by President George W. Bush.

<sup>13</sup> Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/n/03618.html>. (Accessed on 4 March 2009).

<sup>14</sup> U.S. National Security Counsel, *National Security Strategy 2006*, Foreward by President George W. Bush.

<sup>15</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Unified Command Plan 2008*, published 2008. [http://www.cfr.org/publication/18077/departement\\_of\\_defense\\_unified\\_command\\_plan\\_2008.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/18077/departement_of_defense_unified_command_plan_2008.html). (accessed on Jan 20, 2009).

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- <sup>16</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy 2008*, pp 6.
- <sup>17</sup> U.S. National Security Counsel, *National Security Strategy 2006*, pp ii.
- <sup>18</sup> Robert Moeller and Mary Yates. "The Road to a New Unified Command." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 51 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2008): 69.
- <sup>19</sup> Robert Moeller and Mary Yates. "The Road to a New Unified Command." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 51 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2008): 70-71.
- <sup>20</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0. (December 26, 2006), IV 35-36.
- <sup>21</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Decline of America's Soft Power." *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2004), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59888/joseph-s-nye-jr/the-decline-of-americas-soft-power> (accessed on Jan 20, 2009).
- <sup>22</sup> General William Ward, Thomas Galvin, "U.S. Africa Command and the Principle of Active Security." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 51 (4<sup>th</sup> quarter 2008): 62.

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